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I.
The District

INTRODUCTION

abused its discretion when

prevented Dr. Kemp from

obtaining the name of, and conducting any discovery related to, the local physician
assistant Plaintiffs'-Respondents Quigleys' ("Plaintiffs") out-of-state podiatry expert
allegedly spoke to in an effort to meet the mandatory foundational requirements of
Idaho Code Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013, despite this Court's recent statement that a
"defendant should be permitted to conduct discovery as to the identity of consulting
physicians."
Plaintiffs' response brief focuses heavily on two theories in an attempt to
counter this basic discovery concept, neither of which justify affirming the decisions
of the District Court or of depriving Dr. Kemp from discovering whether Plaintiffs'
out-of-state podiatry expert has the required foundation to testify in this case.
First, Plaintiffs argue that disclosure of the local physician assistant would
'impermissibly heighten' the statutory requirements regarding familiarization with
the local standard of care. In doing so, Plaintiffs confuse the statutory requirement
of "be [ing] familiar with the local standard of care" with discovery in the case to
verify the foundation of the expert's knowledge, i.e., if and how the out-of-state
expert became familiar with the local standard of care. Here, discovery related to
Plaintiffs' out-of-state podiatry expert, D.P.M. Nakra, is essential to determine
whether she has the adequate foundation to testify in this case - a foundation she
can only have if the anonymous physician assistant, whom D.P.M. Nakra claims to
have consulted to gain familiarity with the applicable standard of care, in fact had
knowledge of the local standard of care. Without that foundation, D.P.M. Nakra
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 3

would not be permitted to testify per Idaho Code Section 6-1013 and there is no way
fol!

Kemp, the District, and this Court to make that determination without

discovery of that local physician assistant's identity and experience. Dr. Kemp is
therefore entitled to that discovery.
Second, much of Plaintiffs' attempt to shield discovery related to the local
physician assistant to whom D.P.M. Nakra allegedly spoke to hinges on Plaintiffs'
position that the local physician assistant is a retained, non-testifying consultant,
per I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) (now (b)(4)(D)).

The record reflects no such retention.

Moreover, even if the local physician assistant is considered a retained, nontestifying consultant, his/her identity is not shielded by Rule 26(b)(4)(B), because
D.P.M. Nakra is relying on that physician assistant's purported knowledge of the
applicable local standard of care to establish she has met Idaho's foundational
requirements imposed by Idaho law to obtain her "ticket to testify" in this case and
testify as an expert in this case.

As such, Dr. Kemp has shown "exceptional

circumstances" that justify discovery related to the identify and knowledge of the
local physician assistant with whom D.P.M. Nakra allegedly consulted to gain
familiarity with the local standard of care.
These arguments, as well as other minor points raised by Plaintiffs, fail to
support Plaintiffs' position that local providers who provide the required
foundational basis for a testifying expert's knowledge of the local standard of care
can be kept secret. Instead, any such local provider is subject to discovery, and, as
such, the District Court's October 5, 2015, Order Denying Motion to Compel and
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Granting Motion for Protective Order Under I.R. C.P. 26(c) should be reversed and

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Permitting Discovery Regarding Whether D.P.M. Nakra Has Met the
Statutory Requirements of Adequately Familiarizing Herself With
the Local Standard of Care Does Not Impermissibly Heighten the
Requirements of Required Testimony Under LC. §§6-1012 and -1013.
Plaintiffs rely on Bybee v. Gorman to argue that requiring disclosure of a

local provider with whom the expert conferred improperly elevates the testimonial
requirements under Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and -1013, basing this argument on
remarks by both Chief Justice Jim Jones and Justice Horton in the Bybee decision.
(Respondent's Brief at 6-7; Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169, 179, 335 P.3d 14, 24
(2014).) This is an incorrect reading and application of Bybee.
As noted previously, Bybee examined the viability of an affidavit in the
summary judgment context-it was not ruling upon discovery related to local
providers with whom a medical malpractice expert has conferred to familiarize
themselves with the local standard of care:
However, this Court has never held that failure to name the local
expert with whom an out-of-area expert confers is fatal to the
admissibility of that affidavit so long as the other foundation
requirements are met. Indeed, a majority of this Court recently
expressed "grave misgivings" about a plurality opinion's suggestion
"that the identity of the local health care provider with whom a
Plaintiff's expert consults must be disclosed as part of the foundation
for that opinion," expressing our concern that such a rule "elevated
the requirements for an expert's affidavit beyond the
requirements of LC. § 6-1013."

Bybee, 157 Idaho at 178, 335 P.3d at 23 (emphases added)(citation omitted).
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Per Bybee, "[t]he trial court must look at the affidavit 'testimony and
whether it alleges facts which, if taken as true, would render the
testimony of that witness admissible."' Id. at 173, 335 P.3d at 18. Thus, in a
summary judgment context, the identity of the local provider does not need to be
disclosed in the opposition affidavit testimony.

This is presumably because the

court must assume the truth of the foundational facts offered in an expert's affidavit
at the summary judgment stage. It is Dr. Kemp's position that the concerns about
"heightening" expressed in Bybee relate only to challenges to affidavit testimony in
a summary judgment setting where the facts must be construed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party and not in the discovery or trial setting.
Therefore, this holding in Bybee has no application here because this appeal does
not relate to a challenge to the sufficiency of D.P.M. Nakra's affidavit testimony on
summary judgment, but instead relates to discovery regarding the foundational
basis for D.P.M. Nakra's opinions.
The Bybee court supports Dr. Kemp's position, stating that efforts to identify
the local provider would be appropriate in non-summary judgment settings (to wit,
discovery):

The corollary of this holding is that defendant should be
permitted to conduct discovery as to the identity of consulting
physicians. As in Dunlap, an expert's claim to have consulted with a
local practitioner in order to gain familiarity with the applicable
standard of health care practice may present questions of
credibility for consideration by the ultimate trier of fact.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 6

, n.S)(emphases added).

This is consistent with the core ideas that, in the

medical malpractice context, (1) an out-of-area expert must sufficiently demonstrate
an actual knowledge as to the local standard of care and (2) a practitioner in
another specialty must demonstrate knowledge of the specialty at issue. See, e.g.,
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(2014)("As a result, '[a]n expert testifying as to the standard of care in medical
malpractice actions must show that he or she is familiar with the standard of care
for the particular health care professional for the relevant community and time"
and "how he or she became familiar with that standard of care."'); Ballard v. Kerr,
No. 42611, 2016 WL 4151043, at *5 (Idaho Aug. 4, 2016)("An expert of a different
specialty may obtain actual knowledge of the standard of care through interacting
and practicing with physicians of the applicable specialty.")
As part of their argument, Plaintiffs also discuss the methodologies by which
testifying experts may acquire knowledge of the local standard of care.
(Respondent's Brief at 8-10.) Plaintiffs make some largely irrelevant discussion of
how experts can familiarize themselves with deposition transcripts and texts
(which, of course, should be specifically identified to allow for challenge, per Rule
26(b)(4)(1)(i) & I.R.E. 705), but primarily argue that it is the local provider's
"qualitative information" that should be scrutinized-implicitly arguing that the
'quality' of information provided about D.P.M. Nakra's local provider was superior
to that in, say, Arregui v. Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801, 291 P.3d 1000 (2012).

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 7

However, a simple comparison between the disclosure made in Arregui,
versus the disclosure made in this matter, reveals that there 1s actually little
difference. In Arregui, the disclosure stated:
I have educated myself regarding the local standards of care prevailing
in the Nampa-Caldwell area of Idaho, as they existed in June 2007. In
addition to my education and experience, I have spoken with a local
chiropractor, who maintained a chiropractic practice, in Caldwell,
Idaho, in June 2007, the time period relevant to this litigation, as it
was the time period, when Defendant chiropractically [sic] treated
Plaintiff, Martha Arregui. It is my understanding that this
chiropractor was appropriately licensed in Idaho as a chiropractor and
maintained an active practice of chiropractic medicine during the
relevant period. This chiropractor indicated to me that he was familiar
with the local standards of care for performing chiropractic procedures
in the Nampa and Caldwell communities by licensed chiropractors at
the time that the chiropractic care at issue in this case was rendered to
the patient. This physician further confirmed to me that the local
standards of care at that time were, in all respects, consistent with
and, in fact, identical to the standards of care upon which my opinions
in this case have been based, namely, the standards of care in
Oceanside, California in June 2007.

Arregui, 153 Idaho at 809, 291 P.3d at 1008. In the instant case, D.P.M. Nakra's
disclosure stated substantially the same. (R. at 73-7 4.) It was precisely this kind of
"meager" information that the Court rejected in Arregui:
Rather, in a medical malpractice case, it must be shown that the
expert possesses sufficient knowledge of the specific procedures used
by the defendant physician as the alleged malpractice. Here, the
Patient merely asked the district court to believe Dr. Tamai's
conclusory statements that the local unidentified chiropractor
was familiar with the standard of care and because Dr. Tamai
spoke with him, she was also now familiar with the local
standard of care. Such meager information is insufficient.

Arregui, 153 Idaho at 809, 291 P.3d at 1008 (citations omitted)(emphases added).
Without discovery of the local physician assistant's identity and credentials, Dr.
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Kemp, the District Court, and this Court cannot evaluate D.P.M. Nakra's
statements" that the local physician assistant was,
familiar with the applicable standard of care.

fact, actually

As such, Dr. Kemp, the District

Court, and this Court cannot evaluate whether D.P.M. Nakra has adequately
familiarized herself with the applicable local standard of care and, thus, met the
foundational requirements of I. C. §6-1013.
In an apparent attempt to minimize the importance of the foundation upon
which D .P .M. N akra bases her alleged know ledge of the applicable standard of care,
Plaintiffs claim that "Dr. Kemp did not challenge the sufficiency of the foundation
for D.P.M. Nakra's opinions."

(Respondent's Brief at 10.)

Plaintiffs are simply

wrong in that assertion, because that is precisely why Dr. Kemp sought the
discovery, and why Dr. Kemp now pursues the issue on appeal. Dr. Kemp is trying
to discover, and based on what is learned in discovery, potentially challenge the
foundational basis of D.P.M. Nakra's knowledge of the applicable local standard of
care.
D.P.M. Nakra does not practice in Idaho, does not practice orthopedic
surgery, and is not board-certified in orthopedic surgery. Thus, D.P.M. Nakra's only
foundational basis for the local standard of care comes from a local physician
assistant.

Plaintiffs claim that the anonymous local physician assistant has the

reguisite personal foundational knowledge regarding the local standard of care; yet,
they admit the unidentified physician assistant is not an orthopedic surgeon and is
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not board-certified, and they provide only "meager" allusions to his/her work

Because Plaintiffs have provided such meager information regarding the local
physician assistant's qualifications and knowledge of the applicable standard of
care, Dr. Kemp may only acquire such information through compelled discovery.
Dr.. Kemp is entitled to learn whether the unidentified physician assistant is
actually licensed in Idaho and whether the unidentified physician assistant actually
had work experience as represented at the time of Dr. Kemp's care. Discovery will
also illuminate the details of the actual conversation between D.P.M. Nakra and the
physician assistant and in particular, whether any such conversation actually even
occurred.
These are all relevant questions, given they may go to credibility and/or the
sufficiency of foundational knowledge of D.P.M. Nakra herself. See, e.g., Navo v.

Bingham Mem'l Hosp., 160 Idaho 363, 368 n.4, 373 P.3d 681, 686 n.4 (2016) reh'g
denied June 9, 2016. (quoting local provider's disavowal of alleged conversation with
plaintiffs expert); Bybee, 157 Idaho at 179, n.8, 335 P.3d at 24 n.8 ("As in Dunlap,
an expert's claim to have consulted with a local practitioner in order to gain
familiarity with the applicable standard of health care practice may present
questions of credibility for consideration by the ultimate trier of fact.")
Nothing about allowing discovery into D.P.M. Nakra's relied-upon local
physician assistant creates any kind of heightened requirement as to testimony
under LC. §§6-1012 or -1013. Accordingly, the District Court should have allowed
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discovery regarding the anonymous local provider that D.P.M. Nakra relied upon
the District Court's decisions on discovery should be reversed.
B.

I.R.C.P. 26 (h)(4)(B) Does Not Preclude Disclosure of the Identity of
the Consulting Local Specialist Relied Upon by D.P.M. Nakra.
Plaintiffs' response to Dr. Kemp's arguments as to the District Court's error

in using I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) (now I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(D)) to shield discovery of the local
provider are notable for what they do not respond to. First, Plaintiffs' argument
that I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) allows them to keep secret the identity of the local provider
upon whom D.P.M. Nakra relied is largely premised on an unsupported argument
that they "retained non-testifying experts to consult with and educate D.P.M.
Nakra." (Respondent's Brief at 11.) In response briefing, Plaintiffs cite nothing in
the record that establishes that the local specialist(s) were actually "retained" or
"specially employed," beyond the bare allegations of the Plaintiffs' counsel, thus
rendering I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) inapplicable. (Tr. 16:16-17:10.) Plaintiffs' attempt to
av?id this fact by asserting that "Dr. Kemp did not raise this issue in his moving
papers to the district court below[.]" (Respondents' Brief at 11, n.4.) Dr. Kemp did
raise this argument at the hearing on the at-issue motions:
[MS. DUKE:] And so one other point I will note with
subpart (B) is that there is nothing in the record
to indicate that this local person, this local
physician assistant who is not an orthopedic
surgeon was retained. It's just a bare allegation.
We don't have any testimony in the record that she
was paid any money, retained. You're not retained
by just calling somebody and saying, "Hey, can I ask
you a couple questions to see if the local standard
for an orthopedic surgeon in Boise at this time is
the same as the national standard," or whatever that
conversation was. There is nothing in the record other
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 11

than forcing her under this subpart (B).
at

16:16-20 &

1-10.) 1 Plaintiffs also fail to cite any authority wherein

local providers have previously been shielded from discovery under the auspices of
LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B)-again, making LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) inapplicable.
Further, Plaintiffs do not-and cannot-dispute that the non-discovery
provisions of LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) allow discovery of the identity of consulting
experts. Instead, they only contend that such argument is "form over substance."
(Respondent's Brief at 18, n.8.) This is incorrect. Even if the local provider were
actually retained and even if I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) were to apply, Dr. Kemp would
still be entitled to the identity of the local provider, at a minimum.

Manzo v.

Stanley Black & Decker Inc., 2015 WL 136011, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 9,
2015)("Although the case law is not entirely uniform, the majority of courts hold
that the identities of non-testifying experts, as opposed the 'facts known or opinions
held' by such experts, is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(l), providing for discovery
of the 'identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter,' as
opposed to (b)(4)(B), now (b)(4)(D). As a result, identity information is discoverable
without a showing of 'exceptional circumstances."');2 accord Idaho R. Evid. 705.

1

It is accurate that the District Court failed to address this issue/argument before

ruling that the secret local provider was protected as a non-testifying consultant
under Rule 26(b)(4)(B).
2 Where there is no Idaho interpretation of a procedural rule, interpretations of
similar provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are considered persuasive
authority. See David Steed & Assocs., Inc. v. Young, 115 Idaho 247, 249, 766 P.2d
717, 719 (1988) ("Although we are not bound by the federal rule, inasmuch as the
Idaho rule is based upon a federal rule of the same nature, the federal court's
interpretation of the rule is persuasive."); Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. Rudio Lumber
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 12

In failing to rebut these arguments, Plaintiffs instead argue, in essence, that
Dr. Kemp can simply just "obtain information regarding the local standard of care
from another source (including himself)."

(Respondent's Brief at 12-13.)

This

argument misses the point. While Dr. Kemp of course knows the standard of care
that applied to him when he treated Ivfrs. Quigley, what is relevant to this appeal is
how D .P .M. N akra has know ledge of the standard of care she wishes to testify to in
this case, and whether that knowledge provides her with the necessary foundation
to testify.
D.P.M. Nakra has advanced an opinion that the standard of care is different
than that to which Dr. Kemp has testified to, despite her lack of practice as a boardcertified orthopedic surgeon and her lack of practice in Idaho. To do so, she has
relied on an unidentified physician assistant she wishes to keep secret; that is, a
non-medical doctor who is not board-certified in orthopedic surgery. It is the facts
and opinions upon which D.P.M. Nakra has based her opinions that Dr. Kemp seeks
to discover so that he can evaluate whether the physician assistant D.P.M. Nakra
has had to rely on to testify in this case in fact has knowledge of the applicable
standard of care. That only source is the local physician assistant. This is further
consistent with Idaho Rule of Evidence 705, which provides that the underlying
facts and data of an expert's opinion must be disclosed if requested in discovery and
that the expert may be cross examined regarding the underlying facts or data.
Plaintiffs also miss the point by arguing that the Court could correctly hold

Co., 89 Idaho 389, 396, 405 P.2d 634 (1965) ("[T]he federal construction will be
regarded as most persuasive.").
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 13

that D.P.M. Nakra met the foundational requirements of §6-1013. (Respondent's
at 13.)

District Court could not make such a decision that could be

affirmed by this Court because the District Court was addressing cross-motions on
thE? discovery issue of the local provider, not ultimately vetting D.P.M. Nakra as an
expert.

Nevertheless, the Court's conclusion that "I don't think that I have any

intimation that D.P.M. Nakra is telling a falsehood under oath when she said she
had the conversation with the people she said she had" (Tr. at 11. 27:4-8) cannot be
substantiated until discovery of the local physician assistant is permitted to
determine whether he/she in fact has the required knowledge of the applicable
standard of care that D.P.M. Nakra can rely on as an out-of-state expert who wishes
to testify in this case. It is legally irrelevant that the District Court may "think"
that there would not be any reason for an expert witness to mischaracterize such an
interaction (without any information other than D.P.M. Nakra's own unexamined
statement).
The Navo decision aptly demonstrates why the District Court's conclusion on
this point is incorrect. 160 Idaho at 375, 373 P.3d at 683. In Navo, the Court agreed
with the District Court determination that the plaintiffs had "failed to provide
evidence that he [their expert] was familiar with the relevant local standard of
care[.]" Id. That determination was squarely predicated on the shortcomings of the
local provider:
[W]e hold that the district court was correct in finding that in and of
itself, Dr. Steinberg's conversation with Judith Nagel was not
sufficient to give him actual knowledge of the local standard of care in
Blackfoot in December of 2008. In order for Judith Nagel to have
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familiarized Dr. Steinberg with the standard of care, she would have
had to herself been familiar with that standard of care. Appellants fail
to produce any evidence that Judith Nagel was familiar with the local
standard of care in Blackfoot in December of 2008.

Id., at 380-81, 373 P.3d at 690-91. This determination was buttressed by the local
provider's own disavowal of the expert's characterization of their interaction and
her clarification as to her actual lack of knowledge of the local standard of care, as
discussed by the Court:
In conjunction with its motion to strike, BMH submitted the affidavit
of Judith Nagel, stating that:
I do not recall making any statements to Dr. Steinberg about
community standards for nurse anesthetists or for hospitals
either in Idaho or other states. Furthermore, I do not have
actual knowledge of the local community standard of health
care practice that applied to BMH or nurse anesthetists in
Blackfoot, Idaho, in December 2008.

Id.at 368 n.4, 373 P.3d at 686 n.4. Thus, Navo demonstrates that, contrary to the
District Court's conclusion, the possibility a testifying expert may incorrectly
characterize a communication with a local provider is a very real one, and this
mischaracterization can significantly impact the outcome of a case.
Precluding Dr. Kemp from discovering whether the physician assistant has
actual knowledge of the applicable standard of care leaves D.P.M. Nakra's opinions.
unverified and does not permit Dr. Kemp, the District Court, or this Court to
determine whether D.P.M. Nakra has in fact met the foundational requirements of
Idaho Section 6-1012 and Idaho Code Section 6-1013.

Even if the anonymous

physician assistant is deemed a non-testifying consultant under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B),
the fact that D.P.M. Nakra-a retained, testifying expert-utilized that individual's
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knowledge as a basis to form her own opinions, mandates that such individual loses
ability

avoid discovery.

I.R.E. 705 ("The expert may testify in terms of

opinion or inference and give the reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the
underlying facts or data, provided that the court may require otherwise, and
provided further that, if requested pursuant to the rules of discovery the underlying
facts or data were disclosed. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination."); see also Johnson v. Gmeinder, 191
F.R.D. 638, 647 (D. Kan. 2000)("In sum, the policy reasons, the plain language of
amended Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the Advisory Committee Note, and the weight of
authority supports this Court's conclusion that any type of privileged material,
including materials or documents prepared by a non-testifying expert, lose their
privileged status when disclosed to, and considered by, a testifying expert."). Where
an expert relies upon a "non-testifying expert" to formulate their opinions, that nonte~tifying expert can be deposed. See, e.g., Derrickson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,
1999 WL 1456538, at *7 (D. Md. Mar. 19, 1999), aff'd sub nom. Johnson v. Circuit

City Stores, Inc., 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2000)("The court need not waste its time
analyzing the work of Dr. Medoffs assistant as the work of a so-called "nontestifying" expert. Dr. Medoff and his assistant worked hand-in-glove, and the fruits
of their labor are indivisible. Defendant cannot properly cross-examine Dr. Medoff
without first understanding how his assistant manipulated the data.").
The rationale, as explained by the Derrickson court, is simple: Rule
26{b)(4)(B) is designed to keep opposing parties from "free riding" off of the work by
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the other side, but it is not to be used as a mechanism to hide key foundational
evidence from those opposing parties:
Even if the court considered Dr. Medoff's assistant to be a nontestifying expert, the result would be the same. Defendant is not
engaging in the sort of free riding that Rule 26(b)(4)(B) was meant to
prevent. The purpose of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) is to prevent a party from
building its own case through its opponent's diligence. In this instance,
Defendant does not seek to build its own case with Dr. Medoff's work
but rather seeks to tear down Plaintiffs' case. That is entirely proper.

Derrickson v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 1999 WL 1456538, at *8 (citations omitted).
Further, the Derrickson court explained that it was precisely because the nontestifying expert had the core information the testifying expert relied on, that the
non-testifying expert and information he had was discoverable:
Moreover, Rule 26(b)(4)(B) provides that the "facts known and the
opinions held by an expert ... who is not expected to be called at trial"
are discoverable "upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under
which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts
or opinions on the same subject by other means." Only Dr. Medoff's
assistant knows what he did to the data, and because that information
is exclusively within the assistant's cognizance, Defendant is entitled
to it under Rule 26(b)(4)(B).

Id:
To testify in this case, D.P.M. Nakra must meet the requirements of Idaho
law that mandate she must be adequately familiar with the applicable standard of
care for orthopedic surgeons practicing in Boise, Idaho at the time Dr. Kemp cared
for Mrs. Quigley. As an out-of-state expert, D.P.M. Nakra could not do so because
she has never practiced orthopedic surgery or podiatry in Idaho. As such, she relies
on a conversation with a local physician assistant, who also does not practice
orthopedic surgery in Idaho, to advise her on the applicable standard of care for an

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 17

orthopedic surgeon in Idaho. The only way that anyone other D.P.M. Nakra and
Plaintiffs can determine whether this conversation provided D.P.M. Nakra with the
necessary foundation to testify in this case is to conduct discovery of that physician
assistant and his/her practice and to question him/her about the alleged
conversation with D.PJv'.L Nakra. This situation certainly presents the "exceptional
circumstances" allowed by LR.CP. 26(b)(4)(D) if the Court determines that Rule
applies to this case.
For these reasons, even if LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) (now 26(b)(4)(D)) applies, it
does not preclude discovery of the anonymous physician assistant and the District
Court erred in granting Plaintiffs' motion for protective order and denying Dr.
Kemp's motion to compel.

C.

Plaintiffs' proposal of utilizing discovery motions in every medical
malpractice case disregards Bybee, the discovery rules, and
unnecessarily burdens the courts and parties.
Recognizing that Bybee acknowledges the need for discovery of local

providers,3 Plaintiffs suggest that a process wherein the district court makes a
preliminary determination regarding whether a testifying expert has met the
foundational requirements of 6-1013, then determining whether a local provider
needs to be disclosed, would create a predictable and workable solution.
(Respondent's Brief at 14). The crux of Plaintiffs' argument essentially eviscerates
the Idaho Rules of Evidence, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(4)(a)(i), and the
importance of establishing the proffered expert's foundation, including the

3 "The corollary of this holding is that defendant should be permitted to conduct
discovery as to the identity of consulting physicians." Bybee, 157 Idaho at 179, n.8.
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underlying facts and data an expert relies upon to testify and render opinions in a
case. Adopting Plaintiffs' unrealistic position in essence permits testifying experts
to represent whatever they want about conversations with local providers and forces
the opposing party to go to the cost and effort to determine whether additional
discovery can be had related to the expert's foundation and opinions.
Plaintiffs' proposal is premised on the assumption that such local providers
are non-testifying consultants, retained or not, under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B). However,
reliance by the testifying expert on the information provided by a local provider
waives any protections under LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B).

Further, the "data or other

information considered by the witness in forming the opinions" is already required
to be produced, per LR.C.P. 26(4)(a)(i), as well as I.RE. 705.
In addition, discovery motions are to be made in good faith, and discovery
disputes are to be attempted to be resolved without court action. See generally,
I.R.C.P. 26(c) & 37(a). Judicial economy would be thwarted if a party could refuse
to produce information required by the Rules by triggering motion practice on
discovery in every single medical malpractice case involving an out-of-area expert,
imposing unnecessary costs and time burdens on the courts. Nothing in the Rules
or the medical malpractice statutes contemplates the overly burdensome and
expensive additional motion practice proposed by Plaintiffs.
Moreover, Plaintiffs' position undercuts the purpose of the rule in vetting the
out-of-state expert. Here, the District Court merely read a brief summary prepared
by Plaintiffs' counsel of D.P.M. Nakra's purported conversation with the
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unidentified individual. As such, the District Court's hearing only weighed phantom
evidence (the credibility

D.P.M. Nakra), while simultaneously depriving Dr.

Kemp of verifying that evidence or securing any contradictory evidence.
By shielding the physician assistant from discovery, neither the District
Court, this Court, nor Dr. Kemp have the ability to interrogate the veracity and
substance of the foundation for D.P.M. Nakra's opinions. Under Plaintiffs' rule, the
parties (whether plaintiffs or defendants), as well as the court are prevented from
securing evidence like that secured from the local provider in Navo without
burdening the Court with discovery motions in every case. Under Plaintiffs' rule,
assurances that the proffering party's procedure "enables a district court to consider
the relative weight of competing evidence" are empty, as the opposition would be
affirmatively prevented from compiling "competing evidence." (Respondent's Brief
at-17.)
Finally, Plaintiffs' assurances that "in a case where plaintiffs' expert does not
provide specific, detailed explanation of their actual knowledge of the standard of
care, it would be appropriate to allow inquiry into the basis for why said expert
claims to have knowledge of said undisclosed fact" appears to be little more than a
contention that if a testifying expert botches their disclosure as to foundation for
local standard of care, they can still supplement that at some unspecified later
date-but still not disclose their sources.

Any such subjective evaluation is

unworkable; the only appropriate workable solution is disclosure of the local
provider.

Just as the testifying expert would have to specifically identify any
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deposition or medical text they relied on for purposes of the local standard of care,
any local providers the testifying expert utilizes should be identified and subject to
the same kind of scrutiny to evaluate bases for the testifying expert's opinions.
As such, the remedy offered by Plaintiffs cures nothing, and instead offers
only an unnecessary, expensive discovery process to validate the refusal to produce
information that is required to be produced under the Rules.

Under such a

proposal, the District Court judges in medical malpractice cases would essentially
be considering whether additional discovery related to an expert's foundation was or
was not warranted.

Not only would this yield non-predictable results, it would

unnecessarily increase the cost of litigation for all parties, would burden the already
busy District Court judges with unnecessary discovery disputes, and would create
appealable issues-and, therefore, significantly more appeals-as to whether the
District Court abused its discretion with respect to its ruling on each and every
case. Accordingly, the District Court's decisions should be reversed.

D.

The District Court Erred in Making Extra-Statutory Considerations
Favoring Non-Disclosure of Local Specialists.

Plaintiffs argue that "the district court made it abundantly clear that such
'extra-statutory' considerations did not factor into its decisions," quoting a portion of
the District Court's commentary (on an argument raised by Plaintiffs via affidavit
from a medical malpractice plaintiffs' attorney) about a "conspiracy" against local
providers who provide local standard of care information.

(Tr. 25:18-26:15.)

Ph:1intiffs quote the portion of the transcript where the District Court comments
that "[t]here is certainly no record that that's what's going on here," but neglect to
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quote the preceding commentary from the District Court, which makes clear that
District Court

resolving the interpretation in light of this "conspiracy":

And it is an ongoing issue. And I
think I have to resolve it the only way I can by
construing the rules because -- I appreciate
Mr. Mahoney's sentiments that there is a
conspiracy, and I think, frankly, that the whole
legal community knows that it's extremely
difficult to find a local expert. I even had an
occasion where, when I was in private practice, I
had a local expert willing to testify until his
malpractice carrier called and said, "If you
testify in this case, we are going to cancel your
insurance." And if you get your insurance
canceled as a professional, you don't get it
anywhere else. That's a kiss of death.
So that stuff goes on.
(Tr. at 11. 25:18-26:7)(emphasis added).

Thus, more correctly, the District Court

appeared to be framing its construction of the rules through the lens of a
"conspiracy" that makes it "difficult to find a local expert." Such consideration is in
error, and the District Court's decisions should be reversed.

III.

CONCLUSION

Out-of-area medical malpractice experts lacking knowledge of the local
standard of care do not get a "ticket-to-testify" unless they become familiar with
that local standard of care.

Absent this familiarization, an out-of-area expert

cannot claim to be on equal footing with the physician they have been hired to
criticize.

To assess that familiarization, a defending physician must have the

ability to assess the most basic of issues with how that retained out-of-area expert
became familiar with the local standard of care.
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Here, the District Court's refusal to permit discovery as to the local physician
assistant has crippled Dr. Kemp's ability to make those assessments. That, in turn,
impairs Dr. Kemp's ability to seek dismissal, if appropriate, if the local physician
assistant lacked the ability, or otherwise failed, to convey the local standard of care
correctly to D.P.fv:L Nakra. The discovery sought is not complex. Either the local
provider is a licensed practitioner qualified to provide such information to D.P.M.
Nakra, or she is not. Either the local provider has the represented work history and
experience that reflects actual knowledge of the local standard or care, or she does
not. Either she had the represented standard of care conversation(s) with D.P.M.
Nakra, or she did not. Any of these issues may give rise to a dispositive motion by
Dr. Kemp. The District Court's refusal, however, to allow discovery of the local
physician assistant slams the door shut on discovery of issues that go to the validity
of whether D.P.M. Nakra has the necessary foundation to testify in this case.
For these reasons, the District Court abused its discretion when it prevented
Dr. Kemp from obtaining the name of, and conducting discovery related to, the local
physician assistant that Plaintiffs' out-of-state podiatry expert allegedly spoke to in
an effort to meet the statutory foundational requirements of Idaho Code Sections 61012 and 6-1013 and whether, in fact, he/she was adequately familiar with the
standard of care applicable to Dr. Kemp.
Based on the above, Dr. Kemp respectfully requests that the October 5, 2015
Order Denying Motion to Compel and Granting Motion for Protective Order Under
I.R.C.P. 26(c) be reversed and remanded to the District Court.
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